The Basel III Accord was the centerpiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in EuropeGermany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators faced a 'trilemma' in setting capital requirements, having to prioritize among banking sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. Different varieties of national financial system -specifically, banking system and different kinds of 'banking champions' -explain the different prioritization of objectives in the 'trilemma' and hence for the divergent preferences of national regulators on Basel III capital requirements.
Introduction
The Basel III Accord on a 'Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems' issued in late 2010 was the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis. The accord was designed to set capital requirements for banks worldwide. Capital requirements have traditionally been regarded as the main instruments to ensure the stability of the banking sector. In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued the Basel I Accord on 'International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards' (Kapstein, 1989 (Kapstein, , 1992 Simmons, 2001) , which was updated by the Basel II Accord in 2004 (Tsingou, 2008; Underhill and Zhang, 2008; Wood, requirements) , the flow of credit to the real economy and ultimately economic growth. By explaining the trilemma, this research brings insights from Comparative Political Economy into a topic of research -banking prudential regulation -traditionally dominated by International Political Economy.
Second, this paper shows how the preferences of European national regulators on Basel III are the result of the domestic political economy (for a similar argument that focuses more broadly on national political economies see Fioretos, 2010) . However, one needs to look at domestic institutional factors that are often overlooked (or not investigated) by the literature on Varieties of Capitalism, namely the configuration of the national financial system and, more specifically, the national banking system. By carrying out a comprehensive analysis of national banking systems in the UK, France and Germany and outlining their main relevant features, this paper fills a gap in the literature on Varieties of Capitalism. It also explains how different national banking / financial systems result in different priorities assigned by national regulators to the three objectives of the 'trilemma' on banking regulation and capital requirements more specifically. This paper thus develops a predictive framework that can be applied to explain other national positions on international capital standards and, potentially, other areas of banking regulation.
State of the art and theoretical framework
In much of the literature, the assumption is that international regulatory cooperation benefits some countries more than others, affecting the competitiveness of national firms -it has therefore redistributive implications (Oatley and Nabors, 1998) . Consequently, international regulatory cooperation and harmonization will take place only when they are in line with the preferences of the main jurisdiction, which in the past was the US because of the size of its domestic market (Simmons, 2001) . Recently, International Political Economy scholars have considered the preferences and power of other jurisdictions with large domestic markets (Drezner, 2007) . In this literature, policy makers' preferences are shaped by concerns for the competitiveness of national banks in international markets, and by the need to ensure financial stability domestically (Singer, 2004 (Singer, , 2007 . This is the 'dilemma' of financial regulators (Kapstein, 1989) . This paper argues that, rather than a 'dilemma', regulators face a 'trilemma' in their policy making on financial regulation: financial stability, competiveness of financial industry and economic growth, because banks and banking rules have implications for credit to the real economy. Policy makers have to prioritize among these three objectives and their ranking of objectives largely depends on the national variety of financial capitalism. Hence, our use of the term 'trilemma' differs from the financial trilemma of Dirk Schoenmaker (2013) , which examines the interplay of financial stability, international financial integration (notably, crossborder banking) and national financial policies. He argues that any two of the three objectives can be combined but not all three: one has to give. Our trilemma is not conceived in such exclusionary terms: no objective is entirely discarded to achieve the others. Rather, the compatibility of the three objectives of our trilemma can be difficult, optimizing all three objectives at the same time impossible and an order of priority must be set.
A second stream of literature focuses on the pervasive power of big transnational banks, which are influential lobbyists with plenty of financial, human and technical resources at their disposal (Baker, 2010; King and Sinclair, 2003; Tsingou, 2008; Underhill and Zhang, 2008; Underhill et al., 2010) . Building on these insights, Lall (2012, p. 7) argues that Basel II and Basel III were 'the product of regulatory capture by large international banks in G-10 countries'. By contrast, Young (2012, p. 663) qualifies the extent of 'regulatory capture' in Basel II, arguing that while private sector lobbyists had easy access to the regulatory process, this 'access' did not always mean 'influence' over the outcome. Yet, this literature often does not explore the underlying foundations of financial industry preferences, as our paper sets out to do.
Third, social constructivist works on the institutional features and working dynamics of a number of international financial regulatory bodies argue that financial governance arrangements no longer belong to the realm of intergovernmental negotiations but fall within the responsibility of a 'transnational policy community of experts actors' (Tsingou, 2010, p. 21 ). These actors have common professional and educational backgrounds (Chiewroth, 2007) and share similar epistemological views (for example, Kapstein, 1992 defined the BCBS as an embryonic 'epistemic community').
Yet, financial regulation is a technical matter that has significant and different economic and political effects across national banking sectors. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, financial regulation has become less insulated than in the past from politics and politicians (Helleiner and Pagliari, 2011) -it is no longer 'quiet politics' (Culpepper, 2011) . Moreover, the few works that examine the BCBS (e.g., Kapstein, 1989; Simmons, 2001; Wood, 2005) rarely consider its actorness, but rather examine it as an international forum of national regulators, who act in the Committee as 'reluctant diplomats' (Slaughter, 2004) . This is because, unlike for example the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (Chiewroth, 2007; Moschella, 2012) , the BCBS has a skeletal structure of officials often seconded to Basel by national regulators and has a limited budget. Its working groups are composed of and chaired by national regulators. It works by consensus and issues soft law or gentlemen's agreements.
Feeding into the literature on economic constructivism, some authors have pointed out the rise, prior to the international financial crisis, of the 'neoliberal' paradigm (Best, 2003; Gamble, 2009) , that is a 'governance light' approach, which favoured 'market-based governance', based on a benign view of financial markets and grounded in efficient market theories (Mügge, 2011; Underhill et al., 2010, p. 10) . In Europe, the UK was the main promoter of 'light touch' regulation (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009; Macartney, 2010) , which was discredited by the financial crisis. By contrast, France, Germany and Italy had a 'marketshaping' approach to financial regulation, which was in good currency in the aftermath of the crisis (Fioretos, 2010; Quaglia, 2010a, b; Zimmerman, 2010) , especially in government discourse (Buckley and Howarth, 2010) . However, the empirical analysis of the preferences of national regulators on key features of Basel III contradicts this explanation, because the British and US policy makers called for stricter rules on capital, whereas continental Europeans did not support them. Ideas -here set by regulatory paradigms -provide little guidance on national preference formation on Basel III.
There is a literature exploring how domestic policy making / institutional frameworks shape financial regulatory choices, either through embedded legal frameworks that limit regulatory options (Howarth 2013) or through institutional frameworks that work to reinforce or diminish the influence of specific financial lobbies. In Germany, the federal structure of government and the central role of the Bundesrat (upper house) in law making help to explain the influence of the local savings banks and regional banks (Busch 2004; Deeg 1999) . In France, some works highlight the close relationship between administrative elites staffing high-level positions in formerly state-owned banks (Schmidt 1996 , Rouban 2010 . In the UK, the pervasive influence of the City through specific institutional channels has also been critically examined (James 2014) . In a comparative analysis (including France, the UK and Germany), Woll (2014) argues that different types of business-government relations contribute to explaining the way in which the bank bailout packages were devised and implemented across countries (see also Grossman and Woll 2013) . These accounts are useful in order to explain how banks influence public policy (or not) -government-bank interactions -but they are less insightful in explaining what either banks or governments want with reference to banking regulation, 2 that is the sources and the content of their regulatory preferences, which we argue here mostly depends on the distinctive features of the national banking system in which they are embedded and bank business models.
Other authors (for example, Pagliari 2013) have pointed to the role of public opinion and the political salience of financial regulation in order to explain the regulatory reforms undertaken since 2008. This explanation, based on the politicization of banking, points out the public antagonism to bankers and banks generated by the crisis, as expressed in opinion polls and the mobilization of groups to counter the influence of banks. Hence, the British government support for higher capital requirements could be explained by greater public outrage at bailouts (which resulted in part from the size of the bail-out) for 'too-big-to-fail' banks. In France and Germany, the (real and perceived) impact of the crisis was smaller than in the UK (Hardie and Howarth 2013) , as was the public backlash against banks. This explanation focused on the domestic politics of financial regulation chimes well with the one developed in this article:
the way in which the crisis played out in different countries is partly explained by the distinctive features of the national banking systems (Hardie and Howarth 2013) , even though the public authorities' reaction to the crisis was shaped by domestic political dynamics (Woll 2014; Grossman and Woll 2013) .
A relatively recent body of work brings insight from Comparative Political Economy and historical institutionalism into International Political Economy Newman, 2007, 2010; Büthe and Mattli, 2011; Fioretos, 2001 Fioretos, , 2010 Kalinowski, 2013; Posner, 2009 Posner, , 2010 Moschella and Tsingou, 2013) . The basic argument is that 'domestic regulatory institutions are the sources of both power and preferences on the global stage' (Drezner, 2010, p. 794) .
The Comparative Political Economy approach adopted in this paper is inspired by historical institutionalism: it considers banking and more generally financial systems as institutions that shape domestic preferences on international agreements. In so doing, the analysis developed in this paper adds to the Varieties of Capitalism literature, examining the financial underpinning of the national variety of capitalism, that is assumed and rarely explored in the literature (for two partial exceptions, see Busch, 2004; Zimmerman, 2010) . Our analysis teases out three main features of national financial systems that affect the preferences of policy makers on financial regulation (here capital requirements) and specifically the 'trilemma' they face in deciding whether to prioritize financial stability, bank competitiveness or economic growth.
Research design
This paper sets out to explain the prioritization of national regulators on the 'trilemma' objectives and their specific preferences on Basel III, which together form a two-stage dependent variable summarized in Table 3 . The elements of the trilemma, namely stability, competitiveness and the real economy co-exist but they are not interdependent in and of themselves but rather in terms of the impact of selecting one upon the others. For example, if regulators prioritize stability this may have an impact upon the competitiveness of the banking sector (in relation to foreign banks) and upon the real economy (because, ceteris paribus, banks need to deleverage to improve their capital position). However, the prioritization of stability does not suggest a lack of concern for competitiveness and the real economy as objectives. Rather, the argument of this paper is that prioritization is driven by specific features of national banking systems as opposed to the rational interests of regulators.
We focus on national regulators because countries are represented in the BCBS by authorities from central banks or other supervisory bodies. Most of these officials have limited or no power to adopt regulation at the national level but they will always be involved in the drafting of national legislation -and in the political economy literature they are generally referred to as 'regulators'. 3 National politicians were one step removed from the Basel negotiations. We assume that national regulators were aware that the agreement reached in Basel had to be acceptable to their respective political authorities -notably ministers of finance -back home, but this is not to say that the preferences of national regulators in the BCBS were the same as government leaders. We do not investigate the domestic implementation of Basel III which would involve an analysis of the interaction between regulators and governments / legislatures. We are also aware that treating the preferences of national regulators as monolithic is an oversimplification, especially in the UK, where there was a plurality of actors shaping banking regulation, as noted in Section 3. concerned. This hybrid capital is junior to deposits, but senior to equity' (Huertas, 2009: 11) .
British and American regulators insisted that shareholders should take the losses for hybrids rather than the government having to cover it. 
Definition of Capital
Ban on hybrids for all tier 1.
Tolerance on hybrids (esp. for non-core tier 1).
Need to include hybrids ('silent participations'). If one considers the evolution of the negotiations, in its draft issued in December 2009, the BCBS took a surprisingly hard-line approach on capital and liquidity requirements, pushing for a higher adequacy threshold and a restriction on hybrids, with minimum capital to be composed of predominantly equity capital. Given the similarity of preferences of UK and US regulators, their remarkable financial expertise, the large size of their financial sectors and their chairmanship of key working groups, 10 they were able to leave a strong imprint on the initial Basel III draft of December 2009. However, the final December 2010 version was less strict: in particular, it contained longer transition periods. This relaxation owed in part to the extensive lobbying from banks and bank associations but also largely to the resistance of continental European and Japanese regulators to some of the most draconian provisions. Germany is home to two very big, highly internationalized, commercial banks -Deutsche
Level of Capital
Bank and Commerzbank -there are also thousands of undercapitalized public and small local banks which provide the bulk of funding to, and maintain close relations with, small and medium sized enterprises. These banks are Germany's 'local champions'.
International, national and local champions
The internationalization of national banking systems is measured as the percentage of international versus domestically held bank assets and the relative importance of domestic bank lending to the overall activities of banks. Domestic lending forms only a small part of most of these banks' assets ( Figure 1 ). The three largest UK-headquartered banks are major international players and were among the world's ten largest banks in terms of asset size throughout most of the 2000s. All three held a majority of their assets internationally and a large majority of these international assets beyond Europe (Figure 2 ). During the international financial crisis, the British Government required two of the banks (RBS and Lloyds-HBOS)
to accept state funding (with share purchase reaching 78 per cent for the former and 18 per cent for the latter) but intervention in bank management was minimal and 'nationalization' was officially presented as being limited in duration (Woll and Grossman 2013) . Only two of the five largest French banks hold more than 25 per cent of their assets outside the country (Figure 2) . One recent study on European banking systems categorizes three of the five largest French banks as 'domestic', one regional and one 'semi-international' (banks with international operations reaching 25-50 per cent of total operations) (Schoenmaker and Peek 2014) . While all five have significant assets outside the country, they rely on average considerably more on domestic retail banking than the largest UK-headquartered banks (Figure 1) . The three main features of the French banking system -a combination of domestic focus, significant international presence and a high level of banking system concentration 11 -owe directly to state intervention. In the 1980s and 1990s, French conservative governments encouraged the emergence of a limited number of large, vertically integrated banking groups controlled by French corporate shareholders, in a complex network of cross-shareholding with national firms -including insurance companies -both to improve the stability of the system and to foster national champions -a reflection of longstanding industrial strategy (Cohen 1995; Hayward 1995; Schmidt 1996) . Morin (2000, p. 37) has labeled this the 'financial network economy'.
The bancassurance model, in which insurance companies (often subsidiaries of banks) make use of banks to market their products, was also encouraged by state intervention through tax regimes (see Howarth, 2013 for further details). A range of explicit and implicit forms of protectionism were maintained which promoted the retail focus of some French banks. There is a caveat to this picture of a protectionist French banking system. Within a few years of privatization, the cross-shareholding networks began to unravel and foreign control of the largest national banks increased (Clift, 2007; Culpepper, 2005; Maclean et al., 2001) .
Although French banks dominated the domestic banking system, the actual equity ownership of the two large commercial banks became increasingly foreign owned in the 1990s and 2000s. Despite the decline in cross-shareholding portfolios, important features of the 'financial network economy' remained (Clift, 2012; Dudouet and Grémont, 2010) , including shareholding pacts as between BNP Paribas and the insurance giant AXA.
The German banking system was among the least internationalized in Europe and, by a significant margin, the least concentrated. 12 Only the two largest German commercial banks could be described as major international players. The bulk of bank assets were nationally held with the exception of the biggest two ( Figure 2 ) and a small number of other commercial banks. The German banking system was a central pillar of the country's Coordinated Market Economy (CME) by providing 'patient capital', either through cross-shareholding by the large commercial banks (which had declined significantly by the late 2000s) or 'relational banking' (Deeg, 2010; Hackethal, 2004) . The German CME involved a strong reliance of non-financial 
Bank capital position
The Lloyds-TSB was also potentially exposed, as it is one of Britain's largest insurance providers. Banks which did not use equity to fund their activities -public sector, cooperative and mutual banks -faced particular difficulties meeting the new capital guidelines. These banks previously relied on other forms of capital to meet Basel guidelines, notably hybrids and specifically 'silent participations'. The ban on hybrids would hit hardest the German banking system, given the heavy reliance of public and commercial banks on 'silent participations', while the large French mutuals were also exposed. Also, EU implementing legislation of the two previous Basel accords applied the rules to all EU-headquartered banks -not just the internationally active ones -on the grounds of fair competition in the EU internal market.
Without significant dilution then, Basel III would force major changes to the German banking system. It is no wonder then that the peak association representing all German banks asked for a grandfathering clause on Basel III capital rules of 'at least 30 years' (Zentraler Kreditausschuss, 2010, p. 3) and the German government demanded the inclusion of 'silent participations' as acceptable Tier 1 capital in the EU capital requirements legislation (see also Deutsche Bank, 2010) .
The strong opposition of French and German regulators to the use of a leverage ratio reflected the higher ratios of their large commercial banks (compared to the UK) and in particular the difficult situation facing German LB and Sparkassen and French mutual banks given the lack of equity capital (see Figure 4) . 13 Basel III was written having in mind banks funded by equity finance (hence the emphasis on common equities in Core Tier 1 capital), whereas the external funding of many EU-based banks came from other sources. Despite the significant rise in their leverage ratios during the two years prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis, British banks had been among the least leveraged in the EU, well below the Basel III recommended assets to equity threshold of 33 (or equity to asset ratio of 3 per cent), holding on average over a third more equity as a percentage of assets than German banks (ECB Statistical data warehouse). On first examination, the three large French commercial banks appeared to have a similarly low leverage ratio but the ban on double counting would weaken their position.
14 The opposition of French and German banks and their regulators to a leverage ratio, as opposed to a calculation of risk-weighted assets, also reflects the relative importance of trade financing in their overall operations. Trade financing is high in terms of overall assets but low in terms of risk-weighted assets. British example demonstrates that competitiveness can be a trickier issue than much of the literature on 'regulatory arbitrage' and on the dilemma between stability and competitiveness suggests. With regard to capital requirements, and potentially other areas of banking regulation, competitiveness in relation to whom becomes relevant: Basel III promised to make the big British banks more competitive in relation to many EU-headquartered banks but also threatened their competitveness in relation to banks elsewhere.
Bank-industry ties
The third key feature of national financial systems that helps to explain the prioritization of objectives in the regulatory 'trilemma' concerns bank-industry ties. In countries with less developed equity markets and greater reliance on bank credit, banks and more importantly national authorities were worried that tighter capital requirements would lead banks to reduce lending to industry. In most European countries there was relatively high dependence of nonfinancial companies (particularly, small and medium sized enterprises) on bank finance. In Germany, relational (hausbank) banking effectively shaped the preferences of both banks and regulators on capital requirements -in spite of changes in recent years (Deeg 2010) .
French non-financial companies' reliance on equity was comparatively high, although French small and medium sized enterprises were more dependent upon bank credit than their British counterparts -which helps to explain French sensitivities (Howarth 2013) . UK non-financial companies also came to rely much more on bank credit for their funding in the decade prior to the financial crisis, a development encouraged by low interest rates and the securitization of 
Conclusions
This paper has argued that a Comparative Political Economy analysis focused on the configuration of national banking and financial systems has considerable analytical leverage in accounting for the preferences of European regulators on Basel III, explaining the disagreements that emerged in Basel and ultimately the weakness of the reforms eventually agreed by the BCBS, despite the severity of the global financial crisis. National regulators faced a trilemma on financial / banking regulation, trying to achieve three different (at times hardly compatible) objectives. The distinctive configuration of national financial systems in Europe, to be precise three core features of national banking/financial systems, determined the ordering of national regulators' priorities on the trilemma (see Table 2 ) and ultimately on The main findings of this research can be generalized to other cases (i.e., countries). The (inductive) analytical framework centred on three core features of national banking / financial systems can be wielded to explain the preferences of policy makers in other countries on Basel III and, potentially, their priorities on other areas of bank regulation (see Table 3 ). In countries, such as Germany, where strong bank-industry ties persist, policy makers will prioritize the economic growth leg of the trilemma, especially when banks have a weak capital position and thus stricter capital rules will be detrimental to lending to the real economy. In countries, such as the UK and the US, with weaker bank-industry ties, economic growth will be the less important leg in the trilemma for policy makers, especially if domestic banks start with a good capital position.
In countries, such as Germany, where the banking system is characterized by a low degree of internationalization and concentration, policy makers will be the least concerned about the competitiveness leg of the trilemma. Their local champions are unlikely to face fierce foreign competition domestically and national policy makers might use a range of instruments to make difficult foreign penetration into the domestic market. In countries, such as France, that have national champions that aspire to be international (or at least regional / European) champions, national policy makers will prioritize the competitiveness leg of the trilemma. In countries, such as the UK and the Netherlands, that have an internationalized and concentrated banking system with big international champions, policy makers will rank competitiveness high, but not as high as countries (notably France), where policy makers aspire to develop international champions. Post financial crisis, the presence of international banks 'too big to fail' but also 'too big to be rescued' -as in the UK, the Netherlands and Switzerland -encourages national policy makers to prioritize the stability leg of the trilemma, at least in the short to medium term. In a period of 'quiet politics' (Culpepper 2011) , policy makers in countries with international champions will rank competitiveness first.
Finally, it is worth noting that the trilemma concept has implications for future work on international and domestic financial regulation. It alerts scholars to the need to pay attention to the effects of financial regulation (especially banking regulation) upon economic growth, bearing in mind the configuration of national banking and, more generally, financial systems and their links to the real economy. The concept contributes to explaining the politics of international financial regulation, in particular why devising international rules is fraught with difficulties: different countries have different priorities in the trilemma and face different trade-offs. 6 We do not consider the Basel III liquidity guidelines in this paper given limited space but we recognise that they are an important dimension of the attempt to reinforce bank stability.
7 Hybrids are instruments that have some features of both debt and equity. 
